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Abstract 
Three studies investigate the impact of the amount of elaboration on framing effects. In all three 
studies, participants were exposed to decision scenarios similar to the ‘Asian disease’ problem 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). The results replicated previous findings: Participants avoided the 
risky option when the scenario was framed in terms of gains, but preferred the risky option when 
the scenario was framed in terms of losses. Importantly, these effects were most pronounced 
when participants elaborated more on the decision, because of either increased elaboration time 
(Study 1 and 2) or increased processing motivation (Study 3). Moreover, increased elaboration 
led only to more pronounced framing effects when the scenario required to be enriched with 
additional information. The discussion focuses on the possibility that increased elaboration may 
not necessarily result in less bias in social judgment and decision making. 
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More Thought - More Framing Effects? Framing Effects As a Function of Elaboration 
Decisions are often made difficult by their associated chances of gains and potential risks 
of losses. And, as research in decision making has consistently demonstrated, individuals´ 
decisions are strongly dependent on whether the outcomes of alternatives are framed in terms of 
gains or in terms of losses. Most prominently, Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) 
provides a conceptual framework for such framing effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). It holds 
that potential outcomes are considered in relation to a point of reference. As a consequence, when 
alternatives are framed in terms of losses, individuals are more likely to opt for a risky alternative 
that provides the chance to minimize or even eliminate potential losses, but when alternatives are 
framed in terms of gains, individuals tend to avoid risky alternatives. Tversky and Kahneman 
demonstrated this effect with the now classic “Asian disease” decision scenario. In this paradigm, 
participants are informed that 600 individuals are supposedly infected with an Asian disease. Half 
of the participants received a gain frame version of two intervention programs. 
Program A: 200 individuals will be saved. 
Program B: A 1/3 probability that 600 individuals will be saved and a 
2/3 probability that nobody will be saved. 
Although the two options are identical with respect to the product of probability and 
outcome, participants opted for the less risky (non-probabilistic) program A. However, different 
decisions were obtained when the scenario was presented in a loss frame: 
Program A: 400 individuals will die. 
Program B: A 1/3 probability that nobody will die and a 2/3 probability 
that 600 individuals will die. 
When the alternatives were framed in terms of losses, individuals preferred the risky 
(probabilistic) program B. Numerous studies replicated the general pattern of risk aversion and 
Framing Effects As a Function of Elaboration - 4 
 
 
risk seeking when alternatives are presented in a gain frame or a loss frame, respectively (for an 
overview see Kühberger, 1998; Levin, Schneider & Gaeth, 1998).  
Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) may account 
for the impact of framing (as well as for other violations of principles of rational decision 
making). The theory holds that a decision is made after the completion of two phases, the editing 
and the evaluation phase. Decision makers first engage in an editing phase, which relates to the 
adoption of frames and to transformations of objective values and probabilities into subjective 
representations.  In the subsequent evaluation phase, alternatives are weighed, compared, and the 
most preferred alternative is chosen. Prospect Theory assumes an S-shaped value function, and 
because framing shifts the reference point, individuals are more likely to prefer the uncertain, 
risky option when values are framed as losses, but to prefer the certain, risk-averse option when 
values are framed as gains. 
Presumably because the predictions that can be derived from Prospect Theory (Kahneman 
& Tversky, 1979) account for a number of findings that are inconsistent with predictions of 
Expected Utility Theory (see von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), Prospect Theory has received 
considerable attention across a large variety of domains. With respect to framing effects, several 
overviews document the robustness of the classic Asian disease paradigm (Kühberger, 1998; 
Levin et al., 1998). These reviews also reveal that quite a number of different variables have been 
investigated, such as the good at stake (e.g., money vs. human lives), or variations of values or 
probabilities (see Kühberger, Schulte-Mecklenbeck & Perner, 1999). From a social psychological 
perspective it is interesting to note that few studies have addressed the role of elaboration, which 
plays a crucial role in much of the current theorizing in social psychology (e.g., for overviews 
see, for example, the various contributions in Chaiken & Trope, 1999). 
Framing Effects As a Function of Elaboration - 5 
 
 
Several positions regarding the effects of amount of elaboration are conceivable. It has 
been argued that frames serve as contextual cues, which are particularly influential when 
individuals engage in an elaborative, “holistic,” non-analytic processing style (e.g., McElroy & 
Seta, 2003). In support of this assumption, attenuated framing effects were observed when 
individuals perceived the task as highly relevant or when they were explicitly asked to later 
justify their judgments (McElroy & Seta, 2003; Takemura, 1994; see also Takemura, 1992, for 
the impact of deliberation time). From this perspective, a frame allows for simplification, or it 
serves as a piece of information whose impact may be overridden by alternative information that 
is activated by additional processing. 
The above perspective implies that more thinking will reduce contamination from biasing 
factors (e.g., Smith & Levin, 1996). However, the question of whether more thinking leads to less 
bias is not uncontested. For example, the work by Wilson and colleagues suggests that more 
thinking does not necessarily improve judgments and decisions (e.g., Wilson & Schooler, 1991; 
Wilson, Lisle, Schooler, Hodges, Klaaren & LaFleur, 1993). Similarly, with respect to processing 
motivation and accountability, it has been shown that accountability may – at least in some cases 
– increase rather than decrease biases (e.g., Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). If we consider frames as a 
starting point from which decision makers initiate additional processing, then framing effects 
may in fact increase the more individuals elaborate “within” frames. Similar assumptions have 
been made in other domains. For example, investigating how incidental affective states “infuse” 
social judgments, Forgas (1995) has reported consistent evidence that affective influences due to 
mood dependent memory increase with the amount of elaboration. Similar effects have been 
suggested with respect to the impact of anchoring. Specifically, Mussweiler and Strack (1999, 
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) have proposed that the impact of an anchor increases, the more 
individuals think about the anchor--even if the anchor is totally arbitrary and out of range. 
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Similarly, “mere thought” (e.g., Tesser, 1978) or group polarization phenomena (e.g., Moscovici 
& Zavalloni, 1969) are examples for the possibility that additional processing may increase an 
initial judgmental tendency. 
The present research directly addresses the impact of elaboration on the occurrence of 
framing effects. Drawing in part on our prior research (Bless, Betsch & Franzen, 1998), we argue  
that when participants form decisions about the Asian disease scenario, they are required to go 
beyond the information given (Bruner, 1957). Particularly because the Asian disease scenario and 
its alternatives are ambiguous, individuals need to enrich the scenario with additional information 
(e.g., the consideration of conflicting moral values, risking a few or all 600 human lives). We 
contend that with the starting point of a gain versus a loss frame, the enrichment process will lead 
into different directions. As long as additional thinking is influenced by frames, additional 
thinking should increase rather than decrease the impact of the frame. 
There is direct and indirect support for the notion that increased processing may increase 
framing effects. In an intriguing chapter, Svenson and Benson (1993) report experimental 
research in which time pressure was manipulated by allowing participants either a mere 40 
seconds or unrestricted time to make their decision. The results indicate that the differential 
effects of a gain versus a loss frame increased when decision time was not restricted.  Note that 
on a general level this finding conflicts with the findings reported above, according to which 
increasing processing motivation decreases framing effects (e.g., McElroy & Seta, 2003). 
In line with the findings reported by Svenson & Benson (1993), it has been suggested that 
framing effects are more likely when the situational context directly or indirectly implies an 
enrichment of the decision scenario. For example, pronounced framing effects were obtained 
when the Asian disease scenario was subtly described in the context of “medical decision 
making.” However, no framing effects were observed when the scenario was subtly embedded in 
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the context of “statistics” (Bless et al., 1998). Presumably, the latter did not require participants to 
go beyond the information given, but rather to focus on presented numbers and mathematical 
relations. 
An enrichment of the decision scenario should require processing resources. If this is 
correct, then framing effects should be moderated by elaboration. Specifically, framing effects 
are expected to increase with the amount of time allocated to the task (Study 1 and 2) and with 
increased processing motivation (Study 3). Moreover, the impact of elaboration should depend on 
the necessity of engaging in an enrichment process. When the situational context implies no need 
to enrich the decision scenario, framing effects should be attenuated, independent of the 
processing time that is allowed (Study 1). 
Study 1 
Method 
Participants, procedure, design and materials 
 One hundred-two students from the University of Heidelberg were assigned to the 
conditions of a 2(frame: gain vs. loss) x 2(context cue: statistics vs. medicine) x 2(elaboration 
time: short vs. long) quasi-experimental design. Participants were seated in front of a PC monitor, 
on which all information was presented and all dependent variables were assessed. Then 
participants were presented with the Asian disease decision scenario (Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981), and two alternative intervention programs were provided from which participants were 
asked to choose one in order to take measures against the threatening disease. 
Independent variables. To manipulate the frame, we presented the alternatives in terms of 
either gains or losses. The alternatives of the gain frame condition were: If Program A is adopted, 
200 people will be saved. If Program B is adopted, there is a 1/3 probability that 600 people will 
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be saved, and a 2/3 probability that no people will be saved. The alternatives of the loss frame 
condition were: If Program A is adopted, 400 people will die. If Program B is adopted, there is a 
1/3 probability that nobody will die, and a 2/3 probability that 600 people will die. 
 In addition, we varied the context cue, which was presented together with the scenario 
information as a running head in the upper right corner of the computer screen. Half of the 
participants were provided the cue “medicine.” Earlier research has shown that the ambiguous 
Asian disease scenario is normally represented as an ethical, medical problem (see Maule, 1989; 
Bless et al., 1998). Consistently, we hypothesized that a “medicine” cue also establishes this 
impression, and that in order to understand this problem and the consequences of their decision, 
individuals need to go beyond the information given. The remaining participants were provided 
with the cue “statistics.” In this case, the scenario should be clearly understood as a statistical 
problem, not requiring an enrichment process (for the success of this manipulation see Bless et 
al., 1998). 
 The computer was programmed to measure the time between the onset of the presentation 
of the scenario information and participants’ choice of an alternative. A median split was 
conducted (Mdn = 47.3 sec.), which divided participants equally into two groups (short vs. long 
elaboration time) depending on the time they required for their decision. 
 Dependent Variable. Participants were asked for their preferred alternative. They 
indicated their decision for a program by pressing the computer keyboard’s A or B keys, 
representing the programs A and B, respectively. We coded the certain alternative (Program A) 
with 1 and the uncertain alternative (Program B) with 0. Therefore, high values represent the 
tendency towards risk aversion and low values a tendency towards risk seeking. Finally, 
participants were debriefed and received 5 Deutsch Marks (at the time about 2.50 US Dollars) for 
their participation. 
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Results and Discussion 
We conducted an analysis of variance (ANOVA) using a 2(frame) x 2(context cue) x 
2(elaboration time) factorial design. Overall, the sure alternative was preferred over the unsure 
alternative when the alternatives were presented in terms of gains, M = 0.39, rather than in terms 
of losses, M = 0.18, F(1,94) = 5.91, p < .05. This finding reflects the reliability of the framing 
effect applying the Asian disease paradigm (see also Kühberger, 1998). Consistent with earlier 
results, this impact of the frame was moderated by the context cue (Bless et al., 1998). 
Specifically, the framing effect was more pronounced with the context cue “medicine,” M = 0.36 
versus M = .08, t(48) = 2.49, p < .05,  than with the context cue “statistics,” M = 0.42 versus M = 
0.27, t(50) = 1.16, p > .20. In line with prior research, this finding suggests that framing effects 
are more pronounced when the context cue requires an enrichment of the provided information 
compared to when the context cue renders such enrichment unnecessary. 
The observed impact of the processing time supports the conclusion that additional 
processing may lead to more pronounced framing effects. As can be seen in Figure 1, when the 
scenario information required enrichment (situational context cue “medicine”), longer elaboration 
times led to increased framing effects than shorter elaboration times, M = 0.60 versus M = 0.00, 
t(24) = 4.71, p < .01, and M = 0.20 versus M = 0.22, t < 1, respectively. A different picture 
emerged, however, when the context cue (“statistics”) was assumed to determine the meaning of 
the task with less need for enrichment. Here, additional processing was less likely to increase the 
framing effect, M = 0.33 versus M = 0.25, t < 1, and  M = 0.47 versus M = 0.30, t < 1, 
respectively. As expected, this pattern resulted in a significant three-way interaction of frame, 
elaboration, and context cue, F(1,94) = 3.98, p < .05. 
Taken together, the obtained findings are in line with the hypothesis that framing effects 
result in part from additional processing that is necessary when individuals are required to go 
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beyond provided information. A pronounced impact of frames was observed when processing 
time was long and when an enrichment of the provided information was required. We will return 
to the implications of these findings and their relation to prior research in the general discussion 
section. 
Study 2 
The correlational nature of Study 1 limits the conclusions that can be derived from the 
obtained results. Study 2 was designed to address this issue by manipulating processing time. 
Moreover, Study 2 addresses the question of whether the reported findings of Study 1 are 
confined to the classic Asian disease scenario, or whether they generalize across different 
scenarios (see Kühberger, et al., 1999). Participants were presented with either gain or loss frame 
scenarios and were given either a short or a long elaboration time prior to selecting an alternative 
(an intervention program). We expected to replicate the findings of Study 1, namely that framing 
effects increase when more processing is allocated. Further, the impact of processing time was 
expected to generalize to another, structurally similar decision scenario. Finally, an additional 
measure was introduced to investigate whether more thoughts regarding the problem scenario are 
associated with an increased impact of decision frames. For this purpose, after participants had 
selected one alternative, they were asked to list the thoughts that came to mind while they had 
been working on the scenario. 
Method 
Participants, design, procedure, and materials 
Fifty-eight students from the University of Heidelberg were randomly assigned to a 2 
(frame: gain vs. loss) x 2 (elaboration time: short vs. long) between participants design. 
Participants were first presented with the Asian disease scenario (see Study 1) on the computer. 
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After making their decision, participants were asked to list their thoughts that had come to their 
mind while working on the decision scenario. Next, participants were presented an oil tanker 
disaster scenario, which was structurally similar to the Asian disease paradigm. In the oil tanker 
scenario, 200,000 tons of oil is threatening to spill out of an oil tanker into the North Sea, which 
would cause great environmental damage. Again, two alternatives were presented within either a 
gain or a loss frame. After indicating their decision, participants were asked for the thoughts that 
had come to their mind while working on the second decision problem. 
Independent Variable. For the Asian disease, the frame was manipulated as in Study 1. As 
part of the oil tanker problem scenario, participants in the gain frame condition read the 
following: If program A is adopted, 50,000 tons of oil will be saved. If program B is adopted, 
there is a 1/4 probability that 200,000 tons will be saved, and 3/4 probability that no oil will be 
saved. In the loss frame condition participants read: If program A is adopted, 150,000 tons of oil 
will spill. If program B is adopted, there is a 3/4 probability that 200,000 tons will spill, and a 
1/4 probability that no oil will spill. 
Elaboration time was manipulated after the alternatives were presented: Participants were 
required to indicate their answer either within 25 seconds or 60 seconds, and they could not give 
their answer before the time was over. The provided decision times were selected on the basis of 
the results of Study 1. To indicate the remaining time for their decision, a time bar was displayed 
at the bottom of the screen. The procedure was identical for both scenarios. 
Dependent Variables. As in Study 1, participants indicated their decision by pressing the 
computer keyboard’s A or B keys, representing the programs A and B, respectively. We coded 
the certain alternative (Program A) with 1, and the uncertain alternative (Program B) with 0.  
Therefore, high values indicated a stronger risk aversion. Participants were then asked to list all 
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thoughts that had occurred to them while they were working on the decision tasks. Finally, 
participants were debriefed and thanked with 8 Deutsch Marks for their participation. 
Results 
Due to the structural equivalence of the two decision scenarios, and due to similar results 
(treating type of scenario as a within-subjects factor in the analyses did not reveal any impact of 
scenario type, all main effects and interactions F < 1), we averaged the scores for the two 
scenarios. A 2(frame) x 2(elaboration time) factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed the 
classic framing effect: Participants were more likely to prefer the sure alternative when the 
alternatives were presented in terms of gains rather than in terms of losses, M = 0.58 versus M = 
0.31, F(1,54) = 8.02, p < .01. Most importantly, this framing effect was qualified by the extent of 
elaboration, as indicated by a significant interaction of frame and elaboration time, F(1,54) = 
4.64, p < .05. Specifically, when participants had extensive time to make their decision, the 
impact of frames was more pronounced than when the decision had to be made after a short 
deliberation time, M = 0.66 versus M = 0.17, t(54) = 3.50, p < .001, and M = 0.50 versus M = 
0.43, t < 1, respectively. 
A composite measure was computed for the amount of thoughts that participants had 
listed for both scenarios (r = .64, p < .001). Not surprisingly, when participants were provided 
with an extended time for their decision, they reported later more thoughts, M = 3.66, than when 
they had a short time to elaborate, M = 2.92, F(1,54) = 4.42, p < .05, thus indicating that the 
manipulation of decision time indeed influenced elaboration. 
To investigate how the amount of thoughts influence the framing effect, we conducted a 
median split of the sample (Mdn = 3.0) and analyzed participants´ decision as a function of frame 
and amount of thoughts. In line with the outlined hypothesis, participants´ decisions reflected a 
pronounced framing effects when they had listed many thoughts, M = 0.63 versus M = 0.19, t(54) 
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= 2.67, p < .01. In contrast, this framing effect was attenuated and not reliable when participants 
listed fewer thoughts, M = .50 versus M = .37, t(54) = 1.26, p > .20. 
Discussion 
These results support the core findings of Study 1. But the experimental manipulation of 
elaboration time eliminated the interpretation problems of Study 1’s correlational results. Again, 
the classic framing effect was obtained, and again this framing effect increased, the more time 
participants thought about their decision. When given more deliberation time, participants 
presumably enriched the provided scenario with additional information. The frame thus served as 
a starting point, and the more individuals thought about it, the more pronounced was its impact. 
This interpretation is further supported by the thoughts participants reported. Framing effects 
were more likely for participants who reported many rather than few thoughts. Finally, the 
observed effects were not restricted to the Asian disease scenario. The same pattern of results was 
obtained with the structurally equivalent oil tanker scenario, a finding that supports the reliability 
of these effects. 
Study 3 
Study 1 and 2 investigated framing effects as a function of processing time and capacity 
for elaborative enrichment. Consistent with most current theorizing, processing elaboration is   
influenced not only by processing capacity but also by processing motivation (for various models 
see Chaiken & Trope, 1999). If the assumption is correct that the enrichment of the provided 
information and the associated elaborative processes may cause an accentuated influence of the 
decision frames, then increasing processing motivation should result in similar effects as 
increasing processing capacity.  
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With respect to processing motivation, it is important to note that its impact may depend 
on which specific motive is activated (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).  Being interested in 
enrichment processes, in Study 3 we focused on accountability (e.g., Tetlock, 1983). Earlier 
research on accountability has demonstrated that accountable individuals engage in more 
complex information processing than individuals who do not feel accountable for their decision 
or judgment (e.g., Tetlock, 1983; Tetlock & Boettger, 1989). On the basis of our general 
assumption, we predicted that high accountability would lead to more pronounced framing effects 
than low accountability. 
Methods 
Participants, design, procedure, and materials 
One hundred and eighty-three students from the University of Heidelberg received a 
questionnaire (paper-pencil) with the Asian disease scenario, and were randomly assigned to a 
2(frame: gain vs. loss) x 3(elaboration motivation: high vs. low vs. control) - factorial design.  
Before participants were exposed to the decision scenario, we experimentally manipulated three 
different levels of motivated elaboration. 
Independent variables. Half of the participants were confronted with a gain frame of 
decision alternatives of the Asian disease, for the other half  the alternatives were framed in terms 
of losses (see Study 1). In addition to the frame, we manipulated participants´ accountability for 
their judgments. To induce high accountability, one third of the participants was told that some of 
them would later be asked to explain and justify their judgments (see Tetlock, 1983). Another 
third of the participants was informed that the main purpose of the study was merely to pretest 
materials for further studies, thereby inducing low accountability. The remaining participants 
received no additional instructions (control condition). 
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Dependent variable. Participants made their choice for one of the two provided 
alternatives. As for Study 1 and 2, we coded the certain alternative (Program A) with 1, and the 
uncertain alternative (Program B) with 0. High values therefore represent risk-averse choices. 
Finally, participants were debriefed and received a bar of chocolate for their participation. 
Results and Discussion 
A 2(frame) x 3(accountability) factorial ANOVA revealed an overall framing effect: 
Participants were more likely to favor the risk aversive alternative when the alternatives were 
presented in a gain rather than a loss frame, M = 0.52 versus M = 0.22, F(1,177) = 20.01, p < .01. 
As expected, this impact of decision frames was qualified by participants´ accountability, 
resulting in a significant interaction of frame and accountability, F(2,177) = 4.72, p < .01. Further 
analyses of this interaction reveal that when processing motivation was neither increased nor 
reduced (control condition), a reliable framing effect emerged, M = 0.53 versus M = 0.17, t(177) 
= 3.14 p < .001. Increasing accountability resulted in an even more pronounced framing effect, M 
= 0.67 versus M = 0.16, t(177) = 4.44, p < .001, whereas decreasing accountability attenuated the 
impact of the frames, M = 0.35 versus M = 0.33, t < 1. 
These findings are in line with the general hypothesis that increasing individuals´ 
elaboration about their decision increases the differential effects of gain versus loss decision 
frames. Added to the results from Studies 1 and 2, the obtained findings suggest that an increase 
in framing effects may result from increasing elaboration not only directly, by providing more 
time, but also indirectly, by inducing accountability. In line with prior research (e.g., Tetlock, 
1983) we assume that inducing accountability increased the complexity of thinking about the 
scenario. Given that framing served as a starting point, additional processing elicited by 
participants´ accountability increased rather than decreased the impact of decision frames. 
Interestingly enough, this conclusion is in accordance with research on how accountability affects 
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the dilution effect. In this regard, Tetlock and Boettger (1989) demonstrated that non-diagnostic 
information had an increased impact on the required judgment when participants were being held 
accountable. 
General Discussion 
One of the classic findings in judgment and decision making pertains to the impact of 
decision frames. As perhaps most prominently demonstrated by Tversky and Kahneman (1981), 
individuals prefer risky alternatives when the decision scenario is presented in terms of losses, 
whereas risk aversion results from gain frames. The present findings consistently revealed that 
how much individuals thought about the scenario and the decision alternatives affected this 
classic framing effect. Across the three reported studies, framing effects were consistently more 
pronounced when the experimental conditions were likely to elicit an increased elaboration. This 
interaction pattern of frame and amount of processing was observed independently of how the 
amount of processing was manipulated -- either by self-administered processing time (Study 1), 
by an experimental manipulation of processing time (Study 2), or by an experimental 
manipulation of individuals´ accountability (Study 3). In each case, framing effects were reliably 
more pronounced, when individuals’ elaboration of the decision problem increased. 
The effects of the amount of processing are complemented by additional evidence. First, 
in Study 1, additional processing increased framing effects only when the situational context cue 
required an enrichment of the scenario. In line with prior research, we argue that this is the case 
when the Asian disease scenario is presented within the context of medical decision making, but 
not when it is presented in the context of statistics (Bless et al., 1998). In the latter case, no 
enrichment is necessary and individuals may simply stick to the numbers presented in the 
scenario. The obtained findings thus further underscore the notion that framing effects increase 
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when additional processing is necessary and is allocated. Second, in Study 2 we assessed 
individuals´ thoughts about the decision with a thought-listing method and treated the number of 
thoughts as an indicator for the amount of processing. Of importance with respect to the present 
hypothesis is the finding that framing effects were more pronounced, the more thoughts 
individuals had generated. In Study 3 we experimentally varied accountability, assuming that 
high accountability leads to more complexity of thinking (e.g., Tetlock, 1983). Consistent with 
the results of Studies 1 and 2, high accountability led to more pronounced framing effects. 
In combination, the results provide consistent evidence for the notion that framing effects 
are more likely to occur when individuals think more about the decision scenario and the framed 
alternatives. We argue that these findings occur because frames serve as starting points from 
which decision makers engaged in their processing (see van Schie & van der Pligt, 1995, for 
pointing out the particular salience of the frames). If so, it is almost a logical conclusion that the 
more individuals´ processing is guided by a frame, the greater the observable impact of the frame 
should be (unless the additional processing focuses on aspects that are not related to the frame). 
Particularly because the Asian disease scenario and the alternatives are rather ambiguous, 
individuals need to enrich the scenario with additional information (e.g., the consideration of 
conflicting moral values, risking a few or all 600 human lives). Presumably, the activation and 
integration of this additional information is strongly influenced by the initially provided frame. 
Therefore, it is exactly the enrichment of the provided information, the going beyond the 
information given, which increases framing effects. 
Both empirical and theoretical prior research is in line with the outlined general 
assumption. Empirically, the reported findings are consistent with data reported in a chapter by 
Svenson and Benson (1993), who observed increased framing effects when processing time was 
not restricted relative to conditions with a time pressure manipulation. Moreover, our results are 
Framing Effects As a Function of Elaboration - 18 
 
 
consistent with the assumption that situational context cues may invite enrichment of the 
provided information, thereby resulting in framing effects (Bless et al., 1998). 
On a conceptual level, several lines of research support the notion that more elaboration 
may increase the impact of potentially biasing information. For example, in the domain of 
anchoring, Mussweiler and Strack (1999; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) have argued that the 
impact of an anchor increases rather than decreases when individuals are thinking more about the 
anchor. These authors propose, and report supporting evidence, that the anchor serves as a 
starting point, which activates potentially relevant information. The more individuals think about 
the anchor, the more information is activated, and the more pronounced are the anchoring effects. 
Forgas (1995) has applied a similar argument with respect to the conditions under which 
incidental affective states contaminate social judgments. Focusing on mood congruent judgments 
that are due to differential accessibility of positive and negatively valenced information under 
happy versus sad mood, he argues that affect infusion - that is, judgments being influenced by 
individuals´ mood - is more likely when individuals process information in a substantive rather 
than a heuristic way. 
While there is both empirical and conceptual work that is in line with the assumption that 
increased processing may lead to increased framing effects, conflicting evidence has to be 
acknowledged. In particular, recent work by McElroy and Seta (2003), as well as work by 
Takemura (1992, 1994), suggests that increased processing may lead to a decrease rather than an 
increase of framing effects. While some of this evidence is straightforward, some of the findings 
are somewhat inconsistent. For example, Takemura’s research (1992) reveals that participants 
provided with a negative (loss) frame were more likely to prefer risky alternatives, when more 
processing time was allocated. While this pattern is in line with the hypothesis presented here, the 
results obtained for the positive frame show a reversed impact of processing time. Similarly 
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problematic, Takemura (1994) observed that with a negative frame, participants preferred the 
risky option, and that this effect was not only attenuated but completely reversed (more risk 
aversion) when the negative frame was presented to participants under high elaboration 
conditions. Inconsistent findings were also observed with respect to the impact of need for 
cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Smith and Levin (1996) observed decreased framing effects 
for individuals low in need for cognition, while LeBoeuf and Shafir (2003) reported that neither 
individuals´ need for cognition scores nor a justification manipulation were related to the 
preferred alternatives. 
How can we reconcile these seemingly conflicting findings? As a first step, it is important 
to detect and to acknowledge the potentially conflicting findings on the basis of state of the art 
research. Our research contributes to this first step by emphasizing that increased processing does 
not necessarily result in less framing effects. The second step, of course, is to look for potential 
moderators that may account for the seemingly conflicting evidence. Most obviously in this 
respect, additional processing will not result in more framing effects when the additional 
processing is not influenced by the provided frames. In this case, the additional processing may 
lead to an activation and consideration of information that is unrelated to the frame. As a 
consequence, the relative impact of the framing will be attenuated (see McElroy & Seta, 2003). 
What might be conditions that trigger one or the other mechanism? It seems plausible that 
if the situational context implies the possibility of an objectively correct answer, individuals will 
be more likely to focus on the provided numbers rather than on the frame - for example, the label 
“statistics” may imply such an objectively correct answer (Bless et al., 1998). Similarly, the 
information that performance on the task is considered a criterion for graduation could imply the 
existence of an objectively correct solution (McElroy & Seta, 2003, Study 1). Or, it is 
conceivable that cues (e.g., “statistics”) enforce an analytic (versus holistic) processing style, 
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thereby reducing framing effects (see McElroy & Seta, 2003, Study 2). One may also argue that 
different scenarios might be associated with different degrees of how much enrichment is 
necessary. In this respect, it is interesting to note that LeBoeuf and Shafir (2003) observed quite 
different framing effects as a function of different scenarios (see also Kühberger et al., 1999, for 
the impact of the scenario type). Importantly, one needs to consider the possibility that the 
conflicting findings could be due to a curvilinear function between amount of processing and 
framing effects. It seems plausible that up to a point, additional processing will increase framing 
effects - as long as the provided frame is guiding information processing. However, later on in 
the elaboration process other aspects might come to mind that are independent of the frame. If so, 
framing effects will be attenuated. Here it is interesting to note that Takemura (1994) observed 
attenuated framing effects when rather long deliberation time (3 minutes) was induced. 
The investigation of variables that influence whether additional processing increases or 
decreases framing effects is beyond the scope of the present work. We believe, however, that 
such investigation is necessary and important for a better understanding of those mediating 
processes that underlie framing effects. In this respect, the presented approach is important 
because it adds a different perspective to the existing evidence by emphasizing that more 
processing does not necessarily result in less bias due to the framing of the decision alternatives. 
On a more general level - independent of framing effects - this perspective is captured by quite a 
number of approaches. These approaches provide intriguing results, which demonstrates that 
more processing will not necessarily improve judgment and decision making (e.g., Wilson & 
Schooler, 1991, Wilson et al., 1993). 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 1. Percentage of participants selecting the sure option as a function of frame, context cue, 
and processing time. 
Figure 2. Percentage of participants selecting the sure option as a function of frame and 
processing time. 
Figure 3. Percentage of participants selecting the sure option as a function of frame and 
processing motivation. 
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